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Introduction 
During the Cold War, deterrence theory formed the cornerstone of international 
politics and it was the most important school of thought within the theory of international 
relations (Jervis, 1974, p. 289). However, despite its prominence during the atomic era, 
deterrence theory has been sharply criticized. In particular, Lebow and Stein questioned the 
utility of deterrence theory by stating that the existing theories of deterrence are flawed and 
incomplete, therefore unable to predict and prescribe policy (Jervis, Lebow & Stein, 1989; 
Lebow & Stein, 1989).  
Lebow and Stein were also the main critics of deterrence theory in one of the most 
heated debates in international relations of last century. On one side, Huth and Russett 
claimed in their quantitative empirical analysis that deterrence was successful in 
approximately sixty percent of their examined extended immediate deterrence crises (Huth & 
Russett, 1984, p. 505). Lebow and Stein, on the other hand, dismissed the majority of the 
cases listed in Huth and Russett’s dataset and refuted their findings (Lebow & Stein, 1990a, p. 
338-341). The lack of consensus among these scholars regarding the classification and coding 
of the outcomes – deterrence success or failure – of extended immediate deterrence cases is 
remarkable since both teams of researchers employed similar definitions of extended 
immediate deterrence and deterrence success (Fearon, 2002, p. 8-9).  
In light of this debate, this thesis aims to provide a comprehensive answer to the 
research question: “What explains the discrepancy of the classification and coding of 
extended immediate deterrence cases between the empirical studies conducted by Huth and 
Russett on the one hand and Lebow and Stein on the other, and to what extent did this 
disparity result in different interpretations of the examined cases?” 
Examining the deterrence debate is important since the first essential step of 
deterrence theory is to construct a collection of cases consisting out of deterrence successes 
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and failures. Once a valid dataset is built, only then can researchers test their hypotheses by 
their preferred research methods (Lebow & Stein, 1990b, p. 4). Since Lebow and Stein 
disregarded the largest compiled dataset of extended immediate deterrence cases constructed 
by Huth and Russett, a widely agreed-upon dataset to test hypotheses of deterrence theory is 
absent. Therefore, illustrating the root causes of the discrepancy will pave the way to 
constructing a more broadly acknowledged dataset of extended immediate deterrence cases. 
However, before providing a comprehensive answer to the posed question, at first the 
research design will be outlined in which the methodology, corresponding research method 
and case selection are explained and justified. Subsequently, the deterrence debate between 
Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein will be scrutinized, which is essential to grasp the 
content of the empirical analysis. In this part, seven extended immediate deterrence cases will 
be studied; six of these cases were analysed by both pairs of deterrence scholars. Regarding 
the first three cases – the July Crisis of 1914, the Polish Crisis of 1939, and the crossing of 
American military forces of the thirty-eight parallel in 1950 – both teams of researchers 
agreed upon the classification and coding. The other three cases – the Berlin Blockade of 
1948, the Quemoy Crisis of 1958 and the Cyprus Crisis of 1964 – are characterized by the 
contrasting interpretations of both pairs of deterrence scholars. The seventh case, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis of 1962, is an outlier since Huth and Russett did not adopt this case in their 
dataset. However, Huth and Russett’s dismissal is deemed relevant for comprehending the 
disparity in the classification of extended immediate deterrence cases between both teams of 
researchers. In the final part, a succinct conclusion will be given in which the findings of this 
thesis will be reviewed. In addition, a detailed answer to the research question will be 
provided before indicating the theoretical implications of the findings for the theory of 
deterrence.   
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Research Design 
Since the purpose of this thesis is to outline how Huth and Russett and Lebow and 
Stein classified and coded extended immediate deterrence cases, an in-depth examination of 
the debate between both teams of researchers is needed before resorting to the empirical 
analysis. Therefore, in the next chapter, as part of the theoretical framework, the studies 
conducted by these researchers will be summarized. The argumentation provided by Huth and 
Russett and Lebow and Stein to support their classification and coding decisions will be 
thoroughly assessed. Once the deterrence debate is explained in detail, the empirical analysis 
of the extended immediate deterrence cases will be conducted.   
As part of the empirical analysis, seven extended immediate deterrence cases will be 
studied in two separate parts. An empirical case-by-case study is essential to indicate the 
discrepancy of the classification and coding of extended immediate deterrence cases, and how 
this disparity resulted in different interpretations of the examined cases. However, in the first 
part of the analysis, three cases that both pairs of deterrence scholars agreed upon regarding 
the classification and coding of the deterrence outcome – i.e. deterrence failure – will be 
examined. These cases are the July Crisis of 1914, the Polish Crisis of 1939 and the crossing 
of the thirty-eight parallel by American military forces in 1950. In the second part, three cases 
will be analysed that both teams of researchers interpreted contrastingly: the Berlin Blockade 
of 1948, the Quemoy Crisis of 1958, and the Cyprus Crisis of 1964. Because both teams of 
researchers classified and coded only six extended immediate deterrence cases similar to one 
another, illustrating what constituted the mutual agreement regarding these three cases will 
provide insight in what instances both teams of researchers were able to reach consensus. 
Subsequently, by analysing the four cases Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein disagreed 
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upon concerning their classification and coding, a more comprehensive explanation can be 
provided to the question why in these four instances both pairs of deterrence scholars failed to 
reach consensus. An overview of these cases and their respective outcomes is presented in 
Table 1. 
The selection of these seven extended immediate deterrence cases is based on the 
grounds that the researchers provided detailed case summaries in which they explained and 
justified their classification and coding decisions. As a result, the reviewed literature is 
predominated by the works of both teams of researchers. The seventh case – the Cuban 
Missile Crisis of 1962 – is thereby an outlier because the case is absent in Huth and Russett’s 
datasets. The crisis is, therefore, a limitation to the employed methodological approach 
because nothing can be said regarding the coding of the deterrence outcome of this case by 
Huth and Russett. Despite this limitation, the case is still deemed relevant because the crisis 
gives insight of the classification disparity between both teams of researchers. In essence, by 
analysing three extended immediate deterrence cases that both teams of researchers reached 
consensus on, as well as four cases that both pairs classified and coded in stark contrast, an 
all-encompassing answer to the research question can be provided. 
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Table 1: Coding of extended immediate deterrence cases by Huth & Russett and Lebow & Stein1 
Case Year Challenger Protégé  Defender Outcome 
Huth & 
Russett 
Outcome 
Lebow & 
Stein 
July Crisis 1914 Austria-
Hungary & 
Germany 
Serbia Russia Deterrence 
failure 
Deterrence 
failure 
Polish Crisis 1939 Germany Poland Britain & 
France 
Deterrence 
failure 
Deterrence 
failure 
Crossing of the 
38
th
 Parallel 
 
 
 
 
1950 United 
States 
North 
Korea 
China Deterrence 
failure 
Deterrence 
failure 
 
Berlin Blockade 1948 Soviet 
Union 
West 
Berlin 
United 
States 
Deterrence 
success 
No deterrence 
encounter, 
ambiguous 
Quemoy Crisis 1958 China Taiwan United 
States 
Deterrence 
success 
Ambiguous 
Cyprus Crisis 
 
 
 
 
1964 
 
Turkey Cyprus Greece Deterrence 
failure 
Deterrence 
success 
Cuban Missile 
Crisis 
1962 United 
States 
Cuba Soviet 
Union 
N/A Compellence 
success 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 Table 1 is a composition of the data provided by Huth & Russett (1984, p. 506-508) and Lebow & Stein 
(1990a, p. 338-339). 
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Theoretical Framework 
 
Huth & Russett versus Lebow & Stein 
During the 80s and 90s of last century, two teams of deterrence scholars – Huth and 
Russett on the one hand and Lebow and Stein on the other – wanted to determine how often 
deterrence was successful and what criteria influenced the success rate. In 1984, Huth and 
Russett constructed an extended immediate deterrence dataset to employ an empirical study in 
order to reach an answer to the pressing question: “What Makes Deterrence Work?” (Huth & 
Russett, 1984). Huth and Russett’s deductive approach was based on a quantitative study of 
conducting a probit analysis in order to assess the structural relationships between their 
variables and the probability of deterrence success. The outcome of Huth and Russett’s 
expected-utility model supported three of their hypotheses which were derived from classical 
deterrence theory: the challenger is more likely to fight to the degree that the challenger’s 
existing local military capabilities exceed those of the defender, less likely to fight the 
stronger the economic linkages between defender and protégé and less likely to fight the 
stronger the political-military linkages (arms transfers) between defender and protégé (Huth & 
Russett, 1984, p. 509-516). Moreover, Huth and Russett coded thirty-one of the total fifty-
four extended immediate deterrence cases between 1900 and 1980 as successful deterrence 
attempts (Huth & Russett, 1984, p. 505). 
In Huth’s “Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War” of 1988, the dataset was 
adjusted. Without explanation, sixteen original cases were discarded, thirteen new cases were 
added and five cases were recoded (Huth, 1988a, p. 24-27). Nevertheless, the 1988 dataset, 
consisting out of fifty-eight extended immediate deterrence cases between 1885 and 1984 did 
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not result in significant changes. Comparable to the 1984 dataset, approximately sixty percent 
(thirty-four) of the examined cases was judged as successful. The only noteworthy alteration 
was the refutation of the hypotheses that high levels of economic and political-military ties 
influenced deterrence success (Huth, 1988b, p. 435-436). Nevertheless, both studies 
concluded that “deterrence works”. 
This conclusion was refuted by Lebow and Stein who reanalysed Huth and Russett’s 
findings in 1990. Lebow and Stein had rebutted any supportive evidence of deterrence theory 
in their previous works since they found no empirical foundation that supported the 
assumptions of deterrence theory (Lebow & Stein, 1989, p. 224). Unsurprisingly, in their 
revised study of Huth and Russett’s data, Lebow and Stein discarded fifty-three of the total 
sixty-seven cases that Huth and Russett examined in their 1984 and 1988 datasets. With 
regard to the 1984 dataset, only nine of the original fifty-four cases were coded as extended 
immediate deterrence cases. Of these nine cases, only one was an evident deterrence success 
while two other deterrence successes were either partial or short-lived – not one of these cases 
was coded as a deterrence success by Huth and Russett. Of the remaining forty-five cases, 
Lebow and Stein did not find evidence for thirty-seven cases that the alleged challenger was 
seriously contemplating to use force or that the deterrer practiced deterrence. The final eight 
cases were either ambiguous – insufficient historical evidence to confidently permit 
classification and coding, or open to multiple historical interpretations – or compellence cases 
(Lebow & Stein, 1990a, p. 337-340). In stark contrast to Huth and Russett’s findings, Lebow 
and Stein concluded that “among the most important findings with respect to the dependent 
variable is the seemingly elusive and fragile nature of the success of immediate deterrence” 
(Lebow & Stein, 1990a, p. 348). 
The obvious explanation for the classification and coding discrepancy is that both 
teams of researchers defined extended immediate deterrence in contrast to one another. 
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However, Lebow and Stein stated that “we agree that extended immediate deterrence occurs 
only when an attacker contemplates military action against another country and a third party 
commits itself to the defence of the country threatened with attack” (Lebow & Stein, 1990a, 
p. 342). Besides, Lebow and Stein also concurred with Huth and Russett’s description of 
deterrence success, i.e. deterrence success implies that a challenger considered an attack or a 
proscribed action, but did not use force because it was deterred by the defender’s threat which 
entailed unacceptable costs (Lebow & Stein, 1990a, p. 344-345).  
To explain the contrast in the classification and coding of deterrence cases, both teams 
of researchers accused each other of wrongly interpreting historical evidence as well as 
incorrectly conceptualising and operationalising the key concepts of deterrence (Huth & 
Russett, 1990, p. 468; Lebow & Stein, 1990a, p. 344). With regard to the classification of 
extended immediate deterrence cases, Huth and Russett applied the following criteria: 
extended immediate deterrence cases are policies in which a potential challenger is actively 
considering using military force against the protégé of the defender. The policymakers of the 
defender state realize this and, therefore, threaten the use of retaliatory force either explicitly 
or by the movement of military forces in order to refrain the potential challenger from 
attacking (Huth, 1988a, p. 16). To establish the challenger’s intention to attack, Huth and 
Russett looked at the behaviour of the putative challenger, i.e. the challenger’s implicit or 
explicit verbal threats as well as the movement and redeployment of military forces (Huth & 
Russett, 1990, p. 483). 
Lebow and Stein disputed this case selection procedure. According to Lebow and 
Stein, a valid deterrence case implies that the putative challenger must have a serious 
intention to use force and in response the defender practised deterrence. Lebow and Stein 
found no evidence for these conditions to be present in twenty-nine of the thirty-seven 
dismissed cases of the 1984 dataset. Lebow and Stein stated that the intention to attack cannot 
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be established on contextual evidence since military deployments can be used for a wide 
range of purposes, not necessarily with the intent to attack (Lebow & Stein, 1990a, p. 342). 
Lebow and Stein’s almost explicit focus on the behavioural elements resulted in Lebow and 
Stein stating that the seriousness of intention should solely be based on the challenger’s 
intentions, which requires independent historical evidence (Herring, 1995, p. 23). In addition, 
Lebow and Stein disputed that Huth and Russett equated the threat to attack with the intention 
to attack; threats do not forebode attacks because decision-makers may bluff and threaten 
hostile action in situations they may not actually be prepared to use force (Lebow & Stein, 
1990a, p. 343). 
The other source of the variation in the designation of the cases of extended immediate 
deterrence is the criteria Huth and Russett employed to operationalise the defender’s 
commitment. Huth and Russett stated that a deterrence attempt requires that the defender 
issued at least one verbal threat, or displayed force near the presumed challenger’s territory 
(Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 489). This operationalisation contrasted with Lebow and Stein’s 
more rigid criteria: a qualified deterrence case implies that the defender defines the 
unacceptable behaviour, announce the commitment to retaliate, demonstrate the resolve to do 
so, and have the (military) capabilities to implement the issued threat (Lebow & Stein, 1990b, 
p. 27).  
Another explanation for the disparity in the classification of extended immediate 
deterrence cases is that, according to Lebow and Stein, Huth and Russett conflated deterrence 
– the prevention of unwanted action that the challenger has yet to carry out – with 
compellence – manipulating the challenger’s behaviour by issuing threats in order to stop the 
undesirable action the challenger has already undertaken or coerce the challenger into doing 
something the challenger was not doing before (Lebow & Stein, 1990b, p. 23; Morgan, 2003, 
p. 2).  
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Huth and Russett responded by stating that Lebow and Stein confused different types 
of deterrence – non-military deterrent threats with military deterrent threats – and therefore 
erroneously precluded valid extended immediate deterrence cases. Huth and Russett also 
disputed Lebow and Stein’s definition regarding the seriousness of the challenger’s intention 
to attack. Excluding cases on the basis of this assumption would distort the dataset because 
decision-makers may not fully understand, or do not articulate their intentions. Moreover, 
intentions may change during the course of the conflict or are deliberately disguised by the 
actors. Additionally, Huth and Russett dismissed the argument by Lebow and Stein that they 
conflated deterrence with compellence. According to Huth and Russett, a single historical 
case may consist out of both types of policies, therefore a case that includes both deterrent and 
compellent behaviour may still be used to test propositions of deterrence (Huth & Russett, 
1990, p. 474-481).  
However, the deterrence debate extended beyond the issue of classifying cases of 
extended immediate deterrence. With regard to the coding of the categories of the dependent 
variable, Lebow and Stein refuted Huth and Russett’s operationalisation of deterrence success 
and failure. According to Huth and Russett, a deterrence failure is perceived as a military 
attack which implies that the challenger’s government ordered its military forces into combat 
with either the military forces of the protégé or its defender with the amount of fatalities 
exceeding 200-250 – this threshold of fatalities was based on a clear empirical break in the 
distribution of fatalities where armed conflicts occurred. Another condition for a deterrence 
failure is that the challenger achieved its goals regardless of the number of fatalities, and cases 
when the territory of the protégé is occupied for several years (Huth & Russett, 1988, p. 31).  
This operationalisation implies that deterrence may succeed despite the limited use of 
force. Lebow and Stein disputed this operationalisation since the arbitrary number of fatalities 
is not rooted in any theoretical underpinning. Therefore, “we consider deterrence to have 
12 
 
failed when a challenger commits the action proscribed by the defender, or if the defender 
backs away from a commitment in the face of a challenger’s threats and demand” (Lebow & 
Stein, 1990a, p. 344). Deterrence success is achieved when all of the four criteria of the 
defender’s commitment are met which leads to the challenger refraining from attacking 
because of the defender’s threat entailing unacceptable costs for the challenger (Lebow, 1981, 
p. 84-85).    
Another explanatory factor for the variance of coded outcomes is that Huth and 
Russett measured the acceptability of outcomes of crises to the defender instead of looking at 
the success or failure of deterrence. Furthermore, Huth and Russett had the tendency to 
confirm deterrence success tautologically; if the challenger considered an attack but the attack 
did not occur, deterrence was successful. In addition, Huth and Russett improperly designated 
the challenger and defender in multiple cases, which is rooted in their cold-war thinking – i.e. 
incorrectly perceiving the Soviet Union and China as challengers in the majority of their 
extended immediate deterrence cases. Also the third party as either the target of attack or of 
deterrence was misinterpreted in several cases. Finally, Huth and Russett mistakenly coded 
direct deterrence as extended deterrence (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 337, 345, 353).  
Other scholars of deterrence asserted that the methodological divide is responsible for 
the disparity between both studies. Huth and Russett constructed an extensive empirical 
dataset in order to conduct an aggregate data analysis, while Lebow and Stein advocated 
detailed comparative case studies with the result of a low cross-study reliability (Danilovic, 
2002, p. 248-249). Fearon, on the other hand, argued that the framework of classical 
deterrence theory, which both teams employed in their studies, is responsible for the 
discrepancy. Deterrence theory stipulates that a successful deterrence threat has to be credible: 
the challenger has to believe that the issued threat will be carried out (Morgan, 2003, p. 15). 
However, Fearon argued that the cases in which the deterrent threats are the most credible, 
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these threats will also have the highest likelihood to fail because of the challenger’s 
motivations to change the status quo. This phenomenon was denominated by Fearon as the 
selection effect. Thus “if the selection effect operates, then excluding cases in which 
challenger or defender threats were relatively incredible should actually increase the rate of 
immediate deterrence failure in the remaining sample” (Fearon, 2002, p. 6-7). Fearon’s 
selection effect explains the rejection of the majority of the analysed cases if one employs 
Lebow and Stein’s criteria of the credibility of the issued threats. Nevertheless, there are also 
cases that both teams of researchers classified as extended immediate deterrence cases, yet 
differed in the coding of the outcome. Furthermore, there are also cases Huth and Russett 
dismissed but Lebow and Stein adopted in the dataset. Before addressing these cases, at first 
three cases both pairs of deterrence scholars reached consensus on will be examined. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
  
The July Crisis, 1914: 
 In the summer of 1914, following the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, Serbia 
received an ultimatum from Austria-Hungary that was supported by Germany. This 
ultimatum, which was in essence a casus belli, demanded that Serbia would relinquish its 
sovereignty in favour of Austria-Hungary. Serbia agreed with all terms of the ultimatum 
except one, which led to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on 28 July 1914 that 
triggered a series of actions leading up to World War I (Abbenhuis, 2014, p. 219-222).  
 The extended immediate deterrence case revolves around the attempted deterrence by 
Russia to refrain Austria-Hungary and Germany from declaring war on Russia’s protégé 
Serbia. Huth and Russett as well as Lebow and Stein coded the outcome of this extended 
immediate deterrence case as a failure of deterrence. Both pairs of researchers stated that the 
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lack of credibility of the issued threats was responsible for the failure of deterrence (Huth, 
1988a, p. 186; Lebow, 1981, p. 124-125). Prior to the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war, 
Russia clearly indicated its determination to defend Serbia and verbally warned Germany that 
it would mobilise its forces. However, Germany believed that Russia was unprepared and 
unwilling to incite war in order to defend its protégé, therefore these warnings fell on deaf 
ears (Lebow, 2007, p. 89). Even when Russia launched a partial military mobilisation with the 
final attempt to deter the imminent threat of war, the show of force failed to deter Austria-
Hungary from declaring war since Germany and Austria-Hungary continued to interpret that 
Russia would refrain from military action and, therefore, mobilised their own military forces 
in response to the Russian military build-up (Huth, 1988a, p. 68, 185-186). 
The German and Austro-Hungarian neglect of Russia’s threats was the result of 
Russia’s past behaviour concerning Serbia. During the First Balkan Crisis, Russia did not 
back up Serbia – despite its initial proclaimed support – by agreeing to Austria-Hungary’s 
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Instead, Russia forced Serbia to accept the Austro-
Hungarian demands. When the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia erupted another 
time in 1912, Russia bluffed again by accepting the independence of Albania when Russia 
realized that Germany supported Austria-Hungary (Sartori, 2002, p. 135). Consequentially, in 
1914, Germany and Austria-Hungary perceived the Russian threats as a recurrence of Russian 
bluffing (Huth, 1988a, p. 186; Lebow, 1981, p. 122-125). Thus, looking at Lebow and Stein’s 
criteria of the defender’s commitment, the failure of deterrence was rooted in the German and 
Austro-Hungarian misperception of the Russian threats as a result of Russia’s behaviour in the 
previous crises which undermined Russia’s resolve.  
 
The Polish Crisis, 1939: 
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Twenty years after World War I, the looming threat of a belligerent Germany was 
disregarded by Great Britain and France until the German occupation of Prague in 1938. By 
then, Hitler’s continuous pressure on Poland increased the fear by Great Britain and France 
for another German military invasion. As a result, both states extended their deterrence policy 
to Poland by pledging to guarantee Poland’s independence. However, the formed alliance to 
defend their protégé did not deter Nazi-Germany from proceeding with its plan to attack 
Poland on 1 September 1939; resulting in the outbreak of World War II (Huth & Russett, 
1988a, p. 128-137).  
 Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein agreed that the deterrence failure by Great 
Britain and France was rooted, similar to the previous case, in the lack of credibility of the 
issued threats. Hitler did not believe that Great Britain and France would resort to war in order 
to protect Poland’s independence: “the men I got to know at Munich are not the kind to start a 
new World War” (Huth & Russett, 1988a, p. 133). As Hitler’s statement indicates, the past 
behaviour of both states influenced Germany’s perception of their commitment. Hitler 
perceived the issued threats as bluffs because, during the Munich Crisis of 1938, the British 
and French verbal threats failed to underline their resolve to refrain Germany from 
overrunning Czechoslovakia (Huth, 1988a, p. 128; Lebow, 1981, p. 89). The past behaviour 
of both states, as well as the lack of British and French public support for going to war if 
Poland would be invaded, led to Germany questioning the British and French resolve (Huth & 
Russett, 1984, p. 503; Lebow, 2007, p. 148-149). Hitler’s belief that the defending states were 
bluffing was reinforced by the lack of British and French capabilities to carry out the issued 
threats. The British and French military weakness further undermined the already feeble 
credibility of the verbal threats which led Hitler to believe that Great Britain and France were 
bluffing; the commitment was not defensible (Huth & Russett, 1988a, p. 134; Lebow, 1981, p. 
88).  
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A significant difference, however, with the July Crisis is that both teams of researchers 
stated that even if the deterrent threats were perceived as credible, by the late thirties of last 
century it was clear that the warmongering Hitler could not be persuaded from refraining to 
attack Poland regardless of the defenders’ capabilities (Huth, 1988a, p. 137; Lebow, 2007, p. 
148-149). 
 
 
Crossing of the 38
th
 parallel, 1950: 
Following the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, the United States 
intervened militarily to defend South Korea. However, the increased American involvement 
resulted in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) fearing an American hostile attempt to unite 
the country. The PRC attempted to deter the United States from crossing the thirty-eight 
parallel by issuing verbal threats that were teethed by the deployment of Chinese military 
forces. Nevertheless, the Chinese deterrence attempts proved to be futile in the end when the 
United States launched a counteroffensive and crossed the thirty-eight parallel on 7 October 
1950. Consequentially, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intervened which transformed 
the Korean War into a Chinese-American war; something that both actors wanted and tried to 
avoid from the outset of the North Korean invasion (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 184-185).  
Similar to the two previous cases, the deterrence failure of this conflict was rooted in a 
lack of credibility according to both pairs of researchers. When the United States became 
involved in the Korean conflict, the PRC issued statements and warnings to underline the 
Chinese commitment to defend its protégé North Korea (Lebow, 1981, p. 172). “The Chinese 
people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing 
their neighbours being savagely invaded by the imperialists” (Whiting, 1960, p. 60). 
However, the United States perceived these threats as empty bluffs (Lebow, 1981, p. 154, 
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177-178). Similar to the previous two deterrence failures, the past behaviour of the defender 
negatively impacted the credibility of the issued threats. Following the breakaway of Taiwan 
from the PRC, China repeatedly threatened to attack Taiwan for several months yet did not 
attempt any military action. Therefore, when the PRC issued similar warnings that it would 
retaliate if non-Korean forces would cross the thirty-eight parallel, these threats were 
disregarded by the United States (Huth, 1988a, p. 144). “The Truman administration 
dismissed … the Chinese warnings as incredible, and advanced north toward the Yalu” 
(Lebow, 2007, p. 265). 
The American military advancement was not merely the result of the PRC’s past 
behaviour. Comparable to the Polish Crisis, the American perception of the Chinese threats as 
bluffs was reinforced by the questionable military capability of the PRC. In the Polish crisis, 
Hitler’s disregard of the British and French capabilities was rooted in their military weakness. 
However, the capability of the PRC was neglected by the United States because of the 
questionable deployment of the PLA at the Sino-Korean border, instead of stationing the 
military forces in North Korea which would have strengthened the Chinese resolve (Huth, 
1988a, p. 143; Lebow, 1981, p. 180). As a result, the United States held the advantage in the 
immediate balance of forces which “(…) counteracted the potential deterrent force 
represented by the PRC’s capability to mobilize and reinforce the North Korean army with 
superior forces in a general war” (Huth & Russett, 1988a, p. 147).  
  
The Berlin Blockade, 1948: 
The post-World War II rivalry between the Westerns powers and the Soviet Union led 
to a steady build-up of tensions. On June 24 1948, the deterioration of relations culminated in 
the first major crisis of the Cold War when the Soviet Union severed the land and water 
connections between Berlin and the three Western controlled zones, as well as halting all 
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forms of supply to and from West Berlin with the exception of air support (George & Smoke, 
1974, p. 107-117).       
 The Berlin Blockade “(…) cannot be viewed as a simple effort by an aggressor to 
change the local territorial status quo” (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 117). This point was 
stressed by Lebow and Stein who argued that Huth and Russett’s depiction of the actors was 
mistaken. Huth and Russett’s cold-war thinking resulted in mistakenly interpreting the Soviet 
Union as challenger and the United States as the defender of its protégé West Berlin (Lebow 
& Stein, 1990a, p. 346). Lebow and Stein stated that the Soviet Union did not act as an 
aggressor because the Soviet blockade was a response to the Western powers’ repeated efforts 
to integrate the Western occupied zones both politically and economically (Lebow & Stein, 
1990a, p. 369). However, Lebow and Stein assumed that Huth and Russett’s coding of the 
dependent variable was based on the first phase of the Berlin crisis – the institution of the 
blockade – which was refuted by Huth and Russett in 1990.  
According to Huth and Russett, their coding of the deterrence outcome as a success 
was based on the second phase of the crisis after the blockade was established; the reluctance 
of the Soviet Union to interfere with the Anglo-American effort to resupply Berlin by air 
(Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 484). Huth and Russett’s deductive method resulted in that they 
examined whether the putative challenger behaved according to the logic of deterrence theory. 
As a result, Huth and Russett presumed that Stalin, who was using the blockade to change the 
Western policy of West Germany, must have considered what military counteractions were 
possible against the airlift. Therefore, Huth and Russett concluded on the basis of the second 
phase that deterrence was successful since the United States deterred the Soviet Union from 
initiating escalatory actions which was rooted in the Soviet fear of a retaliatory respond by the 
United States (Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 485). 
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Lebow and Stein, on the other hand, stated that the first phase was not a deterrence 
encounter because the Soviet Union cannot be perceived as an aggressor that was eager to 
change the territorial status quo. Because the Soviet Union tried to maintain the status quo by 
trying to strong-arm the Western powers from refraining further integration of West Germany, 
the first phase should be considered as a compellence attempt (Lebow & Stein, 1990a, p. 368-
369). With regard to the second phase, Lebow and Stein dismissed the assumption that 
deterrence was successful and stated that Huth and Russett determined the outcome 
tautologically. In their cold-war thinking the interpreted moderation by the Soviet Union led 
to the faulty conclusion that the United States deterred Soviet hostility (Lebow, 2007, p. 142). 
As a result of Lebow and Stein’s applied logic, Lebow and Stein abstained from coding the 
outcome of this particular phase. Because of the lack of historical evidence of the actors’ 
intentions, Lebow and Stein found it impossible to properly determine whether the Soviet 
Union seriously intended to attack, or that the United States compelled the Soviet Union from 
discontinuing the blockade as a result of the airlift (Lebow & Stein, 1990a, p. 369).  
 
The Quemoy Crisis, 1958: 
Following the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, tensions rose again in the summer of 1958 
between the United States and the PRC. On 23 August 1958, the first phase of the crisis was 
initiated when the PLA began its artillery bombardment of the Quemoy and Matsu 
archipelagos which continued unabated till 4 September. During the second stage of the crisis, 
the United States became increasingly involved which was illustrated by the deployment of 
the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait in order to deter a possible Chinese military invasion of 
the offshore islands (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 363-382).  
Huth and Russett stated that the PRC was concerned regarding a possible Nationalist 
military attack with the support of the United States and therefore wanted to remove the 
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Nationalist military presence from the archipelagos. Since the Chinese did not forcefully 
attempt to remove this presence, the case was coded as a success of deterrence by the United 
States (Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 486). Similar to the previous crisis, Huth and Russett’s 
coding was rooted in the PRC behaving according to the logic of deterrence theory, since the 
military build-up by the PLA underlined the Chinese hostile intentions against Taiwan. 
However, Lebow and Stein dismissed Huth and Russett’s coding of the Quemoy 
Crisis as a successful deterrence attempt. First of all, due to the lack of conclusive historical 
sources, it cannot be indisputably argued that Peking was deterred from initiating a military 
invasion in the second phase. Furthermore, the PLA was not deterred from the lower risk 
action of an artillery assault during the first stage of the conflict (Lebow, 2007, p. 141). More 
importantly, and similar to the previous case, Lebow and Stein accused Huth and Russett of 
incorrectly labelling the PRC as challenger and the United States as defender (Lebow & Stein, 
1990a, p. 353). Related to this, is that Huth and Russett, according to Lebow and Stein, coded 
the deterrence outcome tautologically. Huth and Russett’s cold-war thinking resulted in 
perceiving the PRC as the challenger, therefore, the absence of a full-scale Chinese attack on 
the archipelagos led to their incorrect conclusion that the PRC’s moderation was a successful 
deterrence attempt by the United States (Lebow, 2007, p. 141-142). 
 Hence, Lebow and Stein’s inductive logic resulted in their coding of the outcome as 
ambiguous because of the difficulty of labelling the involved actors as either challenger or 
defender as a result of the lack of historical sources to confidently specify the actors’ 
intentions. From the perspective of the PRC, the intention was to deter the supposedly hostile 
intention of the United States of overthrowing the PRC’s communist regime. Thus the build-
up of military forces was not a prelude to a communist invasion of Taiwan, but a display of 
force in order to deter presumed American aggression. On the other hand, from the American 
perspective, the deterrence strategy was merely defensive in nature since it was aimed at 
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deterring Communist China from occupying Taiwan. This results in a dilemma of coding the 
extended immediate deterrence case. As Lebow and Stein argued, classifying the Quemoy 
crisis as a deterrence encounter implies adopting the Washington perspective of the crisis, 
while categorizing American policy as compellence is to agree on Peking’s perspective 
(Lebow & Stein, 1990a, p. 353-355). 
  
The Cyprus Crisis, 1964: 
In 1963, the Greek-Cypriot president Makarios proposed constitutional revisions 
which would diminish the political power of the Turkish-Cypriot population. The political 
crisis ignited intercommunal violence and resulted in a Greek-Cypriot assault on the Turkish 
enclaves in the summer of 1964. Consequentially, the Turkish air force attacked Greek 
positions which led to the Greek-Cypriots halting their offensive (Lebow & Stein, 1990a, p. 
361).  
Huth and Russett coded this crisis in the 1984 dataset as a deterrence failure because 
the defending actor (Greece) failed to deter the challenger (Turkey) from initiating hostile 
action against the defender’s protégé (Cyprus) (Huth & Russett, 1984, p. 507-508). 
Remarkably, Huth and Russett dismissed the crisis in 1988 on the grounds that adopting this 
case would distort the overall results of the study. Huth and Russett stated that the United 
States attempted to deter Turkey from using military force by issuing a non-military threat 
(the suspension of military aid), therefore the case was irrelevant for the study of military 
deterrence (Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 474-475). However, this statement raises the question 
why the case was initially adopted with Turkey labelled as challenger and Greece as defender.  
Lebow and Stein, however, stressed the involvement of the United States and 
perceived the crisis as the strongest case of a successful extended deterrence attempt (Lebow 
& Stein, 1990a, p. 357). Similar to the two previous cases, Lebow and Stein disputed Huth 
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and Russett’s labelling of challenger and defender. Lebow and Stein stated that labelling 
Turkey as the challenger is historically incorrect because it overlooks the Greek-Cypriot 
aggressiveness. Moreover, Huth and Russett determined the outcome of deterrence on a 
different phase of the conflict than did Lebow and Stein; the crisis encompasses “(…) a series 
of extended compellence and deterrence encounters. In none of them was Cyprus the protégé 
and Greece the defender” (Lebow & Stein, 1990a, p. 361).  
According to Lebow and Stein, the first encounter was in January 1964. Turkey 
informed the United States that it would invade Cyprus unless a cease-fire would be imposed 
on Greece. This compellence attempt failed since the United States failed to secure Greek-
Cypriot compliance. Consequentially, in March Turkey threatened again to military intervene. 
This second compellence encounter was successful in the short-term because the issued threat 
obligated the Security Council to act which resulted in Turkey refraining from attacking 
because Greece was forced to accept a United Nations’ peacekeeping force. Nevertheless, the 
Greek-Cypriots renewed their offensive in April. In June, the third encounter was initiated 
when Turkey informed the United States again that it would invade Cyprus. Subsequently, the 
United States threatened to suspend its military aid to Turkey and indicated that if the Soviet 
Union would intervene Turkey, the United States would not react. As a result, Ankara 
cancelled the invasion (Lebow & Stein, 1990a, p. 361-362).  
Although the United States deterred a Turkish military invasion, Ankara still deployed 
its jet fighters in the end – the phase that Huth and Russett coded as a deterrence failure. 
Nevertheless, the Turkish military threat combined with the diplomatic isolation of Makarios 
and pressure by the United States, resulted in the Makarios government accepting the imposed 
cease-fire. Thus, Lebow and Stein stated that not only did the United States successfully deter 
Turkey twice, but it also successfully compelled the Greek and Cypriot governments to accept 
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the imposed cease-fire which made a large-scale Turkish invasion unnecessary (Lebow & 
Stein, 1990a, p. 361-362).  
 
The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: 
In October 1962, hundreds of millions of lives hung in the balance during the thirteen 
days the Cuban Missile Crisis encompassed. Following Castro assuming power in Cuba, 
Khrushchev decided to place Soviet missiles on Cuba with the intention of defending it 
against American aggressiveness. The United States responded with a naval blockade of Cuba 
which compelled the Soviet Union to withdraw the stationed missiles (George & Smoke, 
1974, p. 447-466). 
The Cuban Missile Crisis is distinctive because it was not adopted as an extended 
immediate deterrence case by Huth and Russett. According to Huth and Russett, the rejection 
of this case was based on the assumption that they were concerned with deterrence of 
different kinds of actions than the ones that Lebow and Stein examined, yet Huth and Russett 
did not elaborate what “kinds of actions” they referred to (Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 477). On 
the other hand, Lebow and Stein stated that Huth and Russett’s cold-war thinking resulted in 
Huth and Russett perceiving the case solely from the American perspective. By labelling the 
Soviet Union as challenger, the crisis was perceived as a direct deterrence case because the 
deployment of the missiles implied the Soviet Union challenging the United States. However, 
according to Lebow and Stein, by perceiving the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet 
perspective the case should be classified as an extended immediate deterrence case. The 
deployment of Soviet missiles on Cuba (protégé) was a defensive action since the Soviet 
Union intended to deter a prospective American invasion (Lebow & Stein, 1990a, p. 345).  
Similar to the Berlin Blockade, the Quemoy Crisis and the Cyprus Crisis, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis consists out of different phases. With regard to the first phase, Lebow stated 
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that “the onset of crisis between the two superpowers over Cuba is more properly 
characterised as a deterrence failure (…)” (Lebow, 2007, p. 142). Kennedy had drawn a line 
by indicating that the American security would be endangered if the missiles were to be 
placed on Cuba. Despite defining the proscribed action and communicating the commitment 
to Khrushchev through different channels on several occasions, Kennedy’s commitment was 
challenged by the Soviet Union that stationed the missiles in Cuba (Freedman, 2000, p. 165). 
 The second phase of the crisis is based on the American response. Because of the 
unreliability of the success of an air strike, Kennedy ordered a “strict quarantine on all 
offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba” – i.e. a naval blockade (Allison, 1969, 
p. 704-706). Lebow and Stein coded the outcome of this phase as a (partial) immediate 
compellence success since the blockade did not just halt the deployment of the missiles, but 
led to the Soviet Union retracting all the missiles from the island; although this came at the 
cost of the United States withdrawing the missiles deployed in Turkey (Lebow & Stein, 
1990a, p. 345).  
 
Conclusion 
In light of the deterrence debate between Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein, the 
purpose of this thesis has been to provide a detailed answer to the research question: “What 
explains the discrepancy of the classification and coding of extended immediate deterrence 
cases between the empirical studies conducted by Huth and Russett on the one hand and 
Lebow and Stein on the other, and to what extent did this disparity result in different 
interpretations of the examined cases?” 
To answer this question, an empirical case-by-case analysis of seven extended 
immediate deterrence cases has been conducted to examine the classification and coding 
decisions of both teams of researchers. The most important finding of the empirical analysis 
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is, that there is not one encompassing factor that can explain the disparity between the 
conducted studies. Before pointing out the root causes of the disparity and the implications of 
this disparity on the examination of extended immediate deterrence cases, first the cases Huth 
and Russett and Lebow and Stein classified and coded similarly will be reviewed.  
Regarding the July Crisis, the Polish Crisis, and the crossing of the thirty-eight parallel 
by American military forces, both teams of researchers reached consensus on the 
classification of these cases as extended immediate deterrence cases. Additionally, they 
agreed upon the coding of their outcome as deterrence failure. In all three cases, the 
challenger’s seriousness to attack as well as the commitment of the defender to protect its 
protégé was indisputable. Because war broke out, the differences in the operationalisation of 
the dependent variable between both teams of researchers did not affect the coding of the 
outcomes. Moreover, the interesting parallel is that all three deterrence failures were rooted in 
a lack of the defender’s credibility since the challenger perceived the defender’s threats as 
bluffs because of the defender’s past behaviour. 
However, the other four crises that did not result in war were classified and coded in 
stark contrast to one another. The first explanation for this contrast is that in their quantitative 
study, Huth and Russett derived their hypotheses from the axiomatic method and concluded 
that states behave according to the logic of deterrence theory. This approach contrasted with 
Lebow and Stein’s focus on having historical evidence of the intentions of the involved 
actors. Concerning the Berlin Blockade and Quemoy Crisis, Huth and Russett presumed that 
the Soviet Union was considering an escalatory move against the airlift, while PLA’s military 
build-up underlined the Chinese hostile intentions. Contrastingly, Lebow and Stein did not 
find evidence of their hostile intentions and therefore withheld from coding these cases as 
either a success or failure of deterrence.  
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Related to this is the contrast of labelling the actors as challenger or defender. In the 
Berlin Blockade, Quemoy Crisis and Cyprus Crisis, Lebow and Stein refuted Huth and 
Russett’s labelling of the actors. Regarding the Berlin Blockade and Quemoy Crisis, Huth and 
Russett’s cold-war thinking explains their interpretation of the Soviet Union and PRC as 
challengers, for which Lebow and Stein did not find historical evidence. Huth and Russett’s 
cold-war thinking also affected the classification disparity of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Huth 
and Russett’s American perspective resulted in classifying the crisis as a direct deterrence 
case. However, as Lebow and Stein indicated, from the Soviet perspective the crisis is an 
extended immediate deterrence case.  
Huth and Russett’s cold-war thinking also led to their tendency to confirm deterrence 
successes tautologically. Because Huth and Russett perceived the Soviet Union and PRC as 
challengers intended to use force, the absence of an attack implied the success of deterrence.  
Furthermore, the disparity in the outcomes of deterrence concerning the Berlin 
Blockade is rooted in the contrasting operationalisation of the dependent variable by both 
teams of researchers. Huth and Russett’s operationalisation led to coding the outcome as a 
deterrence success because a possible attack on the protégé was repulsed by the defender 
without military conflict between the involved actors. However, a case that should have been 
interpreted as a partial deterrence failure (when looking at both phases of the crisis) was 
coded as a deterrence success (Levy, 1988, p. 498, 504). Lebow and Stein refrained from 
coding this case because they deemed it impossible to indicate the intentions of the involved 
actors and, as a result, it could not be stated whether deterrence had succeeded or failed.  
Lastly, regarding the Berlin Blockade, Quemoy Crisis and Cyprus Crisis, both teams 
of researchers reached contrasting conclusions because they classified and coded the 
outcomes of these cases on the basis of a single dominant deterrence encounter which was 
viewed independently of each other (Harvey, 1997, p. 122). Based on the second phase of 
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both the Berlin Blockade and Quemoy Crisis, Huth and Russett coded the deterrence outcome 
of both cases as a successful. With regard to the Cyprus Crisis, Huth and Russett dismissed 
the case because of their explicit focus on the Turkish deployment of jet fighters, yet 
overlooked the important role of the United States in the preceding encounters in which it 
deterred Turkey from launching a military invasion. Lebow and Stein, on the other hand, 
dissected the Berlin Blockade into two different phases and coded these phases separately, yet 
failed to do so with regard to the other two cases despite outlining the multiple encounters in 
the Cyprus Crisis. 
In essence, by highlighting the contrasts between both teams of researchers in their 
decisions regarding the classification and coding of extended immediate deterrence cases, and 
the implications of their differences on the study of extended immediate deterrence cases, the 
first step towards constructing a widely-agreed upon dataset has been made. As a result, the 
most important implication of the findings of this thesis for the theory of deterrence is that the 
approach of classifying and coding extended immediate deterrence cases on a single, 
dominant exchange of deterrence viewed independently of each other should be dismissed 
because the sequential nature of crises is thereby neglected (Harvey, 1997, p. 122-124). This 
approach is particularly harmful for the coding of the dependent variable, because success or 
failure of deterrence is not a one-time event since crises are composed out of a series of 
interrelated decisions (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 93). Therefore, dichotomously coding the 
dependent variable on the basis of one specific deterrence encounter overlooks how 
deterrence operates in practice. This implication leads to the recommendation that further 
research on testing strategies that focus on multiple exchanges in protracted crises is needed, 
because it may lead to developing a more satisfactory approach of classifying and coding 
cases of extended immediate deterrence cases.  
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